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ESSAYS
WHY DO LAW STUDENTS INSIST THAT ARTICLE 2
OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE APPLIES
ONLY TO MERCHANTS AND WHAT CAN WE DO
ABOUT IT?"
Scott J. Burnhamt
I (a law professor) agree to sell my pen to you (a student) for
$10. This agreement:
(a) is a UCC transaction
(b) is not a UCC transaction because the parties are not
merchants
(c) is not a UCC transaction because the sale is for less than
$500
(d) both (b) and c)
Every year I ask this question on my Contracts exam, and
every year many students get it wrong. Why do law students
insist that Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code applies
only to merchants?' We tell them, again and again, that
Article 2 applies to the sale of goods, but it doesn't register.
Why? After teaching Contracts for a number of years, in a
0 ©1997 Scott J. Burnham. All Rights Reserved.
Professor of Law, The University of Montana School of Law.
' In this essay, 'the Code" or "Article 2" refers to the text of Article 2 of the
Uniform Commercial Code 1997 Official Text. 'Revised Article 1" refers to the text
of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws ("NCCUSL")
September 1997 draft of Revised Article 1. "Revised Article 2" refers to the text
of the NCCUSL March 1, 1998 draft of Revised Article 2. These drafts are
available at the NCCUSL official website,
<http-/www.law.upenn.edu/library/ulc/ulcihmt#uccl>.
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number of localities, I have come to some tentative conclusions
regarding this phenomenon and what can be done about it.
Perhaps the very name-Uniform Commercial Code-
contributes to the confusion. The Code's first section, 1-101,
states that "This Act shall be known and may be cited as
Uniform Commercial Code."2 I find this an odd provision, for
although the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws promulgates a uniform code, each state
enacts a variation of it. It seems to me more reasonable to say
that a state enacts not the Uniform Commercial Code, but the
Louisiana Commercial Code or the North Dakota Commercial
Code. Perhaps the section reflects the Commissioners' futile
battle against local variation. In any event, my concern is not
with the Uniform aspect of the Code but its Commercial
aspect.'
What does it mean that the Code describes itself as
Commercial? The Code never defines the term. In section 1-
102,' we learn that one of its purposes is "to simplify, clarify
and modernize the law governing commercial transactions." No
help there. In fact, "commercial transactions" sounds like
something the heavy hitters do, not what I do when I sell you
a pen. Another purpose is "to permit the continued expansion
of commercial practices through custom, usage and agreement
of the parties." No help either. "Commercial practices,"
"custom," and "usage" sound like terms that those involved in
a business-i.e. merchants-deal with, not what you and I do.
The section also says that a purpose is "to make uniform the
law among the various jurisdictions." This purpose is of no
concern to me if I am only an occasional buyer or seller, not in
business, not venturing beyond my jurisdiction. The Code does
not, as the philosophers like to put it, claim me. In finding the
Code inhospitable to nonmerchants, the students appear to
recapitulate history, for the "law merchant," grew out of the
' Revised § 1-101 improves it with brevity: "This [Act] may be cited as the
Uniform Commercial Code."
' As to whether it is even a Code, that is a subject for another day. See, e.g.,
Grant Gilmore, Legal Realism: Its Cause and Cure, 70 YALE L.J. 1037, 1042.47
(1961).
4 This section is largely unchanged in Revised § 1-102(a).
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need for merchants to establish their own body of law,
separate from the common law.5 We ordinary folks have never
quite fit into its confines.
Much of the confusion may also stem from the Code's use
of the word merchant.6 One would think that if the Code
occasionally enumerates special rules for merchants, known in
the literature as the "merchant rules," then the rest of the
time the rules apply to everyone else. But who is everyone
else? Nonmerchants of course. Curiously, the Code never refers
to nonmerchants, leaving us to ponder when it states a rule for
merchants, what the rule is for nonmerchants. Sometimes the
rule is easy to determine. If a firm offer is made by a
merchant, then presumably a nonmerchant cannot make a
firm offer.8 On the other hand, if additional terms are
proposed and "between merchants such terms become part of
the contract," then between nonmerchants or between a
merchant and a nonmerchant do they not become part of the
contract?9 And, notoriously, if a nonmerchant receives a
confirmation and does not object to it, does the writing satisfy
the Statute of Frauds?' °
If students find it difficult to make these negative
inferences, they are in good company. Karl Llewellyn believed
that if, under the circumstances, it is reasonable to apply a
merchant rule to one who is not a merchant, then by all means
apply it." Yet the present Code commands exactly the
opposite:
' Arthur Linton Corbin, The Uniform Commercial Cde-Sale: Should It Be
Enacted?, 59 YALE L.J. 821, 822-24 (1950).
'This term is defined in U.C.C. § 2-104(1) (1997).
' See, eg., Zipporah Batshaw Wiseman, The Limits of Vision: Karl Llewellyn
and the Merchant Rules, 100 HARV. L. REV. 465 (1987).
' U.C.C. § 2-205 (1997).
U.C.C. § 2-207(2) (1997).
1o U.C.C. § 2-201(2) (1997).
' Revised Uniform Sales Act (1941) Proposed Section 1-B, a section that did
not survive the drafting process, provided:
Mercantile Rules in Transactions Not Between Merchants. A provision of
this Act which is applicable 'between merchants" may be applied by the
court to a transaction not between merchants if the reason and
convenience of the provision justify so doing. Such application is subject
to review.
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The fact that "merchant" is thus used in some sections does not
mean that only those sections are applicable to merchants. "Seller"
and "buyer" include all persons so engaging whether merchants or
not. Accordingly all sections are applicable to merchants and some
sections are only applicable to them. 2
In expressing confusion about to whom the provisions apply,
students may be on to something, perhaps perceiving the ghost
of Llewellyn's flexible ideas behind the present Code's
expression. There seems to be consensus now that the dual
standard of the Code should yield to different rules for differ-
ent relationships.
Ignoring that the labels represent a continuum rather
than a dichotomous pair, we can construct a matrix of possible
Article 2 transactions between a sophisticated party and an
unsophisticated party: 3
BUYER
UNSOPHISICATED
UNSOPHISTICATED
SELLER
SOPHISTICATED
SOPHISTICATED
12 1A Ronald A. Anderson, Uniform Commercial Code § 2-104:5 (3d ed. 1996)
(emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
'1 It is not an amazing coincidence that this chart resembles Marc Galanter's
matrix of one-shot and repeat players in his wonderful piece, Why the eHaues"
Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC'Y
REv. 95, 107 (1974).
I II
Unsophisticated Buyer Sophistlcated Buyer
and and
Unsophisticated Seller Unsophisticated Seller
III IV
Unsophisticated Buyer Sophisticated Buyer
and and
Sophisticated Seller Sophisticated Seller
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Box IV, sophisticated buyer and sophisticated seller, represents
what we generally think of as a commercial transaction: Hertz
buys a fleet of cars from Ford. Box I, unsophisticated buyer
and sophisticated seller, represents what we generally think of
as a consumer transaction: I buy a car from a Ford dealer. Box
II, unsophisticated seller and sophisticated buyer is a fairly
rare sale of goods transaction, particularly among those that
are litigated, for the buyer will rarely be wronged; and when it
is, even though it has the greater resources, it may well choose
the course of swallowing its losses: I sell my car to a Ford
dealer.'4 Box I, unsophisticated buyer and unsophisticated
seller, is the transaction at issue: I sell my car to you.
The consumer transaction embodied in Box HI receives
virtually no attention in Article 2."s The extent to which this
omission should be remedied is the source of great debate, but
there seems little doubt that Revised Article 2 will recognize
this transaction and the special rules that it invokes.16 Explic-
itly admitting consumers to the Code will not solve our prob-
lem, however, for it is Box I that represents the area where
students instinctively find the Code inapplicable. It is the only
transaction that does not involve a merchant, who is by defi-
" An exception may be the cases arising under § 2-201(2) in which a farmer
receives a confirmation of an oral contract, although the issue in those cases is
whether the farmer is in fact an unsophisticated party. Revised § 2-201 does not
resolve the problem, although Note 3 contains an echo of Llewellyn's lost Section
1-B.
Subsection (b) retains the confirmation principle in Section 2-201(2) with
the following change. The text states that only the recipient of the
confirmation must be a merchant. The text does not say that merchant
may or may not be a farmer. The conclusion that farmers can never be a
merchant, however, is rejected. See Section 2-201 (1995), Comment 2,
paragraph 2, which states that the merchant concept under Section 2-
201(2) rests 'on normal business practices which are or ought to be
typical of and familiar to any person in business."
Revised § 2-201(2).
" The term consumer is not defined, which makes sense because the term is
not used except in the phrase consumer goods, which is defined by reference to
Article 9 in § 2-103(3) and which makes one appearance, in § 2-719(3).
6 See, eg., Symposium: Consumer Protection and the Uniform Commercial
Code, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 1 (1997). Revised Article 2 § 2-102(a)(8) defines
'consumer" as "an individual who buys or contracts to buy goods that, at the time
of contracting, are intended by the individual to be used primarily for personal,
family, or household use." U.C.C. § 2-102(a)(8) (1997). The defined term is then
used in a number of substantive provisions.
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nition a sophisticated party.17 The transaction is not a con-
sumer transaction, for it involves two consumers, and thus
lacks the theoretical purpose of the designation, to protect the
unsophisticated from the sophisticated. 8
In our teaching, we do little consciously to make clear that
this transaction is part of Article 2, and perhaps much
unconsciously to suggest that it is not. When we and our mate-
rials send contradictory messages to students, they quite
properly pick up on what we do, rather than what we say.1"
For example, we make distinctions between "commercial" and
"noncommercial" contracts, and between "commercial
contracts" and "consumer contracts.2 0 In many doctrinal
areas, such as unconscionability, fraud, or the parol evidence
rule, we explore disparate results that can be explained by
such a characterization of the parties. We may say that in
commercial cases, such and such is usually the result, but in
non commercial cases it is so and so. We do not then say:
I have just used the term commercial in a different context than it is
used in the Uniform Commercial Code. In fact, I might add, I have
just used it in its more natural context, to describe parties that have
experience in the business, which is to say merchants. But don't
conclude from this that when the Code says commercial, it means
merchants.
Absent this explanation, is it any wonder the students assume
commercial in the context of the Code has the same connota-
tion?2
17 U.C.C. § 2-104(1) (1997).
18 Revised § 2-102(a)(9) defines "consumer contract" as "a contract for sale be-
tween a seller regularly engaged in the business of selling and a consumer."
19 The Reporter for the Revised Article 2, Professor Richard E. Speidel, was
the co-author of an excellent casebook, Commercial and Consumer Law, the text of
which emphasized the integration of the topics, but the title of which suggested
dichotomy.
2 The phrase consumer goods makes its sole Article 2 appearance in § 2-
719(3):
Limitation of consequential damages for injury to the person in the case
of consumer goods is prima facie unconscionable but limitation of damag-
es where the loss is commercial is not.
Id. This provision exemplifies the confusion, for it seems to divide the world into
consumer parties and commercial parties, even as we strive to remember that both
are governed by this commercial code.
2 In early drafts, Karl Llewellyn used the word mercantile, a word that has
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Students experience similar cognitive dissonance when
they encounter the merchant rules. Only fourteen provisions of
Article 2 make specific reference to merchants, but these four-
teen somehow loom large in the eyes of students. One explana-
tion for this phenomenon is that in a first-year course, the
instructor usually approaches the Code piecemeal, contrasting
certain Code sections with the common law rule. Because they
often study offer and acceptance early in the course, students
probably first encounter sections 2-205 and 2-207, with the
term "merchant" leaping out at them. One would think that
some elementary principles of statutory interpretation would
begin to take root. If a given rule applies "between merchants"
or to a "merchant seller," is there not an implication that an-
other rule applies not between merchants or to a nonmerchant
seller? And if every word in a statute counts, would the legisla-
ture in its wisdom have added a reference to merchants if the
rule applied only to merchants anyway? These may be sophisti-
cated thoughts for students just beginning the study of law.
Faculty who lament that students think the Code applies only
to merchants undoubtedly also lament that law study empha-
sizes case law at the expense of statutory law.'
In an attempt to redress the balance, one year I changed
the pedagogy. Students would not plunge into particular Code
sections without the larger context of the Code. Furthermore,
following the theory that students will learn what they discov-
er for themselves better than what a teacher tells them, I
designed a simple problem to guide their discovery. I asked
them to read all of Part 1 of Article 2, sections 2-101 through
2-107, dubbed "Short Title, General Construction and Subject
Matter," and to use those provisions to answer this question:
"If I sell my pen to you, is that a Code transaction?"
The first student I called on answered firmly, "No." I
asked her what analytical steps she had taken to reach that
conclusion. "I reached it," she responded, "because section 2-
now disappeared entirely from the Code. It may have been a good choice, for a
mercantile practice is clearly the practice of merchants, professional buyers and
sellers. Use of that word would have kept commercial from doing double duty,
now referring to generic buying and selling, now referring to activity by profession-
als. a2 See, eg., Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation-in the Classroom and
in the Courtroom, 50 U. CHL L. REV. 800 (1983).
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104(1) defines merchant as 'a person who deals in goods of the
kind' and under that definition you are not a merchant." I had
to admit that what she said was absolutely correct. She did,
nevertheless, concede under my patient questioning that that
definition was not in fact used in any of the other sections, but
she remained dubious about the relevance of that observation.
I tried one more pedagogical approach. Late in the year, as
I was spinning out an Article 2 hypothetical in which an unso-
phisticated seller made a deal with an unsophisticated buyer, a
student came to life with a flash of insight and exclaimed,
"Wait a minute! Doesn't Article 2 only apply to merchants?"
My response, an involuntary muscle reflex induced by this
unintended assessment of my teaching abilities, was to clutch
the area of my chest where my heart was located, utter a
groan, and fall to the classroom floor, where I lay still until I
could recover from the blow. In retrospect, I thought this was
pretty good. Drawing an analogy to the pedagogical theory that
students will remember the professor's jokes about a subject, I
concluded that these students would never forget the rule
because they would remember my response and hopefully con-
nect that response to the statement that prompted it. I was
therefore taken aback when I found this comment among the
student evaluations that semester:
When Professor Burnham pretended to have a heart attack when a
question was answered wrong, it was funny, but I was afraid to
answer a question because I didn't want everyone to know how
dumb I was. I think many questions went unasked for fear of giving
Professor Burnham a heart attack.
Believe me, I swear I will save my heart attack for this ques-
tion, but I guess the students do not know that. Sensitive to
any act that would silence the class, I have refrained from
further heart attacks to make the point.
The heart attack approach suggested to me the possible
efficacy of the "dying words" approach. An interviewer once
asked hotel owner Conrad Hilton whether he had any words of
* wisdom for the American people. "Yes," he responded. "Put the
shower curtain inside the tub before you shower." Similarly, I
wonder if some great person might die uttering the words,
"Article 2 applies to all transactions in goods." As the story
[Vol. 63:12711278
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was repeated to generations of law students, perhaps it would
stick, just as we all remember the significance of "Rosebud."
Any volunteers?
It seems to me there are three approaches to solving this
problem: (1) we could change our teaching; (2) we could change
the students; (3) or we could change the Code. The tenacity of
adherence to a wrong rule, even in the face of systematic and
enlightened pedagogy, leads me to give up hope that changing
teaching will do the job. Can we change the students? As they
refuse to change, I am sometimes convinced that the error is
genetic, a case of nature over nurture. After all, students who
have never before encountered the Code and have therefore not
been taught one view or the other, cling to the wrong view.
Students who have "learned" the rule in Contracts I get it
wrong in Contracts H and years later in Commercial Law.
Nature would also explain why many lawyers and judges make
the same mistake, failing to mention the Code in their analysis
of a transactionY Perhaps the modern alchemy of gene splic-
ing will eventually allow us to identify and remove the incor-
rect understanding.
' The cases are legion in which a court neglects to apply the Code to a trans-
action involving the sale of goods or to a transaction involving unsophisticated
parties. Even the Code commentators are not immune. Official Comment 3 to § 2-
715 refers to 'excuse under the section on merchant's excuse by failure of presup-
posed conditions," even though § 2-615 is titled 'Excuse by Failure of Pre3upposed
Conditions" and the section refers to "a seller," which § 2-103(l)(d) defines as "a
person who sells or contracts to sell goods." Any person. See U.C.C. § 2-103(lXd)
(1997).
The opposite phenomenon is also common-cases where a court applies the
Code to a service transaction. In Burnham v. Superior Court of California, 495
U.S. 604 (1990), the Court held that a California court had personal jurisdiction
over the defendant even though his contacts with the state were brieE Comment-
ing on the services the defendant had received from the State of California, Jus-
tice Scalia stated:
Three days' worth of these benefits strike us as powerfully inadequate to
establish, as an abstract matter, that it is "fair" for California to decree
the ownership of all Mr. Burnham's worldly goods acquired during the 10
years of his marriage, and the custody over his children. We daresay a
contractual exchange swapping those benefits for that power would not
survive the "unconscionability" provision of the Uniform Commercial Code.
Id. at 623. Not only would such an exchange not be a Code transaction, but to
add insult to injury, California enacted a nonuniform version of the Code that
does not include the unconscionability provision.
1997] 12.79
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In the meantime, as we await more enlightened teaching
methods or more precise gene splicing, perhaps it is time to
change the Code. The best solution may be to state expressly
that the Code applies to this transaction-not in law school,
where my experience shows the fix does not take, but in the
Code itself, where the reader is more likely to believe it. What
better time than now, while Article 2 is undergoing revision?
This suggestion raises an interesting question: for whose bene-
fit are statutes written? If writers are encouraged to speak to
an audience, to whom is the Code addressed? The drafting
process seems to take on a life of its own, with the drafters
regarding their audience as each other.' Once promulgated,
the Code speaks to legislators, who ask if they wish this docu-
ment to be the law of their jurisdiction. Once enacted, it
speaks to lawyers, who may find it advantageous to redraft old
forms, and to judges, who must grumpily adjust to a new
scheme. Its greatest potential audience, the buyers and sellers
whose transactions it regulates, probably pay the least atten-
tion to it,' throwing its readership back to lawyers and judg-
es when things go wrong.
There is, however, a potential audience of some 40,000
readers a year entering the nation's law schools, more than
enough to make a work a best seller. Unlike the instrumental-
ist readers who study it with a purpose in mind, these readers
actually sit down and read the damned thing in an attempt to
understand it as an intellectual exercise. And if they get it
right, far less damage may be done down the road when those
2" See Richard Hyland, Draft, 97 CoLUM. L. REV. 1343 (1997). Consider revised
§ 2-103(b), which provides:
(b) If a transaction involves both information and goods, this article ap-
plies to the aspects of the transaction which involve standards of perfor-
mance of or rights in the goods other than the physical medium contain-
ing the information, its packaging, and its documentation. However, this
article applies to a sale of a computer program that was not developed
specifically for a particular transaction and that is embedded in goods
other than a copy of the program or an information processing machine,
if the program was not the subject of a separate license with the buyer.
Id. This provision seems to be written in, well, code. See David Mellinkoff, The
Language of the Uniform Commercial Code, 77 YALE L.J. 185 (1967).
" See, e.g., Stewart Macaulay, An Empirical View of Contract, 1985 WIS. L.
REv. 465.
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enlightened students become the lawyers and judges using the
Code in planning, in dispute resolution, or even in the legisla-
ture when the inevitable amendment process begins.
A subtle approach might review all Code sections with a
view to imparting the flexibility that would make them appli-
cable to each box in our matrix unless expressly stated other-
wise. An unsubtle approach-and who needs subtlety when our
goal is to hit the reader over the head-would be to come right
out and say it. What would such a provision look like? Revised
section 2-103 begins with even greater clarity than the present
section 2-102: "This article applies to transactions in goods." A
good start. The point that causes confusion might be brought
home: "This article applies to transactions in goods. It applies
to transactions in goods regardless of the status of the parties
as merchants or nonmerchants."
Another alternative would be to place the clarification in
the Official Comments, where many good suggestions for revi-
sion of Code sections have found a resting place. An Official
Comment to section 2-103 might explain that Article 2 covers
all transactions in goods:
Article 2 covers all transactions in goods, regardless of the sophisti-
cation of the parties who enter the transaction. Article 2 covers
transactions in which one party is a merchant (see § 2-102(23)),
transactions between merchants (see § 2-102(2)), consumer transac-
tions (see § 2-102(9)), and transactions between two nonerchants."
To illustrate:
(a) Auto Manufacturer Inc. sells a fleet of cars to Auto Rental Inc.
Article 2 covers the transaction, which is between merchants. (b)
Auto Dealer Inc. sells a new car to Mary Smith for her personal use.
Article 2 covers the transaction, which is a consumer transaction.(c)
Mary Smith sells a lemon peeler to her neighbor John Brown. Arti-
cle 2 covers the transaction, which is between nonnerchants.
Contracts between unsophisticated parties do not fit snug-
ly in the present structure of Article 2. To date, the revision
process has not remedied this situation. The revisers have
addressed consumer contracts, but that does not accomplish
the same purpose." Revised Article 2 should either exclude
this transaction or expressly include it.
26 In fact, when the revisers create an exception for consumer contracts, they
are by implication putting the unsophisticated parties on a par with the sophisti-
cated parties. See, e.g., Revised § 2-209.
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